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Urban governance in the South of Europe:
cultural identities and global dilemmas
The concept of governance has been evolving into one of the most important but
also dubious concepts in urban politics. The enlightening perspectives of cooperation,
participation and collective construction are accompanied by shadowed fears of public
demission, oligarchic regimes and less local democracy. These lights and shadows and
the dilemmas they bring along are particularly relevant when observing the cities of
the south of Europe, whose socio-cultural specificities very much structure local
political and policy materialisations. Joining urban Mediterranean socio-political and
cultural perspectives — including when gaining cosmopolitanism, and thus reducing
North-South dualisms — this paper proposes a systematisation of governance ten-
dencies and directions for deeper analysis of the Mediterranean urban world.
Keywords: urban governance; Mediterranean cities; social capital; cultural capital.
Governança urbana na Europa do Sul: Identidades culturais
e dilemas globais
O conceito de governança tem vindo a tornar-se num dos mais relevantes, mas
também mais dúbios conceitos em política urbana. As perspectivas luminosas de
cooperação, de participação e de construção colectiva são acompanhadas por receios
sombrios de demissão pública, regimes oligárquicos e diminuição da democracia local.
Estas luzes e sombras e os dilemas que trazem são particularmente relevantes quando
se analisam as cidades do Sul da Europa, cujas especificidades socioculturais estruturam
muitas das materializações políticas locais. Conjugando as especificidades culturais e
sociopolíticas do mundo urbano mediterrânico — incluindo quando aumenta o seu
cosmopolitismo e se reduzem dualismos Norte-Sul — este artigo propõe uma
sistematização das actuais tendências de governança, bem como correspondentes
direcções de aprofundamento analítico.
Palavras-chave: governança urbana; cidades mediterrânicas; capital social; capital
cultural.
URBAN GOVERNANCE TODAY
European cities have been positioning themselves in recent decades at a
crossroads of history. The changes and restructures occurring in their
rhythms, densities, and landscapes, as well as in their broader to inner
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cognitive and cultural dimensions, have led European urban territories and
societies into new types of pressures and challenges. These pressures and
challenges are found in their most varied sociopolitical urban contexts,
marked simultaneously by parallel confrontations in important features —
from the continuous pace to absolute time-space flexibility and modularity of
the economic and socio-cultural chains; to the crisis of the welfare state,
raising new types of social needs and demands.
These fascinating but also disruptive times, rising above the heritage that
François Ascher called the Fordist-Keynesian-Corbuosian paradigm (1995)
with the development of hyper-territories, meta-expressions, and increas-
ingly complex functionalities of urban life, work, consumption, and mobility,
are framing new types of fluxes and externalities that outstrip the capacities
of the present political urban governments and institutional arrays.
At the same time, long-established socio-political structures and
stakeholdings are also being reframed by these sorts of urban changes. What
today seems widely recognised in most of the political, socio-cultural, and
academic realms is that this historical mutative scenario demands, from
cities and urban societies, an absolute need to reinterpret several of their own
structures and attitudes toward urban politics, urban administration, and
urban governance (Bagnasco and Le Galès, 2000; Jouve, 2004).
Multiple new urban-driven strategy policies were developed, many with
promising (and realised) degrees of innovation and inclusion, others raising
doubts about democratic procedures and cost-effective public deliverance.
New types of urban projects and urban policies were consolidated; varied
institutional structures were created; processes of administrative
deconcentration and political decentralisation, some against the odds, were
slowly raised; different arrays of principles and tools for urban strategy,
urban planning, and even civic participation and civic rights, were proposed;
more elaborated and influential forms of critical questioning upon urban
socio-political regimes have been consolidated; political and instrumental
improvements in social engagement and civic participation have been raised.
However, in spite of all these processes, the last two decades have also
revealed certain blockades. Even for some of the seemingly most necessary
political developments — such as the creation of metropolitan political au-
thorities configuring stronger governance commitments at recognised scales
of critical urban collective regulation and action; or the need for new public
enforcement in face of deviation of resources and democratic procedures —
many urban societies have been showing that the paces of their “real cities”
are not being adequately followed by corresponding paces on the part of
their “socio-political cities”.
This paradoxical scenario, having both wider opportunities for develop-
ment and equity but also most challenging hurdles, seems to fully corre-
773
Urban governance in the South of Europe
spond to what Henri Lefebvre introduced 40 years ago as the long period
of disorientation with the (then) expected outcome of the urban revolution
(1970). This shows clearly to be the case for the present urban world of
Southern Europe.
An important feature of this socio-political paradox seems to lie on a
conjunction of standstill with demission attitudes on the part of the State
toward the city. On one hand, recent decades have witnessed the gradual
evolution of post-fordist urban policies — and more recently even the
reconfiguration itself of neoliberal urban policies — which tended to
prioritise neo-schumpeterian perspectives and to promote the enforcement of
entrepreneurship and competitiveness (Harvey, 2001; Jessop, 1994; Brenner,
2004). These perspectives were justified by expected provisions for the
cities of higher levels of social, economic, and creative qualifications, in a
world of permanent appeal to new challenges in the areas of competitive-
ness, and sometimes of its own social emancipation and inclusion. But also,
and relevant to our themes under consideration here, these were proposals
also developed through the expectation of the enhancement of urban soci-
eties with much stronger urban actor’s activity, flexibility, and pro-active
attitudes, thus catalysing governance networks and resulting in broader ur-
ban dynamics and socio-economic development.
On the other hand, however, severe criticism was raised about how it
has been through these logics that structural changes have occurred in the
political arenas and agendas, remodelling whole structures of urban politics
and raising important questions regarding the potential deployment of main
urban values such as equity, social justice, and even democracy. For the
critics, several years of neo-liberal dismantlement or even disruption of
governmental public institutions have diffused (or fragmented, as some say)
established political strategies and territories of public domain, these losing
their prime role in urban provision and even in urban strategy and planning,
with perverse repercussions on social and collective results.
Urban politics comprehends a vast arena where coexist very different
dimensions ranging from national strongholds to local political communities
and to civic neighbourhood, from metropolitan strategic planning to human
resources administration, from EU cohesion funding to real estate and swap
finance. Within all these matters, the evolution of the forms of dialogue and
conflict between different urban actors (between governmental and institu-
tional organs themselves but obviously between these and the most varied
actors of the civil society) remains a vast and triggering forum.
These are perspectives that follow the fields of the social sciences atten-
tive to the city — which in truth should be mainly understood as a social
construction — where emphasis is placed on the perceptions, identities,
strategies and practices deployed in the actions of the multiple actors and
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communities living within the city’s extent. This correspondingly recognises
that socio-cultural capital, and what the literature refers to as “systems of
action”, in a city are not bound only to specific urban design or urban
planning configurations, but also incorporate the support structures and daily
energies that leverage the city’s destinies. The French sociologist Alain
Touraine (1984, p. 31) reflected about social life as a process, arguing for
the necessary replacement of the “society” concept by a “social life” con-
cept, much more centred on the actors’ actions and interactions:
the essential is that the growing separation between the actor and the
system might be substituted by its interdependency, by the idea of system
of action […] instead of describing the mechanisms of the social system, of
its integration or disintegration, of its stability or change […] we have to
substitute the study of the social answers by the analysis of the mechanisms
of auto-production of social life.
Through these scenarios filled with lights and shadows, an appreciation
of the relational and processual concept of urban governance has been
evolving. Let us therefore recall one of the most interesting definitions of
governance (Bagnasco and Le Galès): “a process for the coordination of
actors, of social groups and institutions in order to achieve collectively
discussed and defined goals in a fragmented or even obscure environment”
(id., p. 26). It is as if each city, and within it each project, policy, or simple
administrative process, should be seen as a collective construction whose
success depends on the best or worst emergence of the interrelationship and
co-responsibility networks, and the best or worst directions in the intercon-
nection of its political, social and cultural forces, and the pressures and
influences amongst the different actors on stage (Jouve, 2003; Pinson,
2009). These perspectives evidently have to be supported with the existence
of a considerable degree of concrete rationality in governance management,
thus implying the existence of dialogue and consensus-building structures
across several scales: spaces, instruments, and mechanisms, both formal
and informal, through which conflict and cooperation fluxes might be proc-
essed with considerable proximity and the formation of interdependencies
and partnerships is materialised with sizeable doses of objectivity.
Sizeable doses of democracy, inclusion, and transparency are also called
for, as the notion of urban governance, and its enduring and still quite
appealing potential in the settings of urban politics, also carries important
risks and mirror-side perspectives. This is so, firstly, because the simply
utopian consideration of the city as a collective actor might bring (despite
its virtues) obvious difficulties of consistency, often entailing concrete risks
of reification — thereby amounting to nothing more than a constant
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deconstructivism; and secondly, because these discourses might also be the
way for the consolidation, in many cities, of oligarchic governance decision-
making political communities, through partial consensus-building processes,
and thus not necessarily contributing to collective objectives. The fact is that
after more than two decades in the spotlight of many academic and political
debates and proposals, governance retains, and has even expanded, its light
and shadows.
POLITICAL DILEMMAS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE CITIES
OF THE SOUTH OF EUROPE
Some authors — though not that many — have been examining the
differences and specificities of the South European cities, namely in face of
the most recent urban major challenges (see Leontidou, 1990, 1993 and
2010; Nel.lo, 2001; Chorianopoulos, 2002; Borja, 2003; Domingues, 2006).
Most of these authors consider that for many of these Southern cities and
metropolises, there has been a distinctive path of urban development and
restructuring, as well as distinctive modes of governance, at least throughout
the major part of the 20th century. Amongst other geopolitical and cultural
specificities, this caused not only quite specific urban production processes
(strongly understood in major trends like the peri-urbanisation of vast Medi-
terranean urban and coastal areas), and also sharp reductions in most cities
qualification and competitiveness (Chorianopoulos, 2002).
The differential focusing understood on these few scholarly and critical
analyses upon most recent socio-political developments in Southern Euro-
pean cities, reinforce our view that the Mediterranean city genius loci still
remains weakly analysed by academia, if not misled. Following Leontidou
(1990, p. 2), “some of their everyday manifestations like informality, com-
munity life and socializing, song and football attendance, or mutual aid and
illegal building, meet the indifference and scorn” of most of the academic
and socio-political theorisers, fed on Marx, Weber, and other major north-
ern/Protestant social thinkers, and “are taken advantage of by the State” —
this leading to a situation where “creativity and spontaneity thus oscillate on
the verge between opposition and cooptation”.
Our present purpose here is to discuss and better understand correspond-
ing differences, pluralities, and common features structuring urban govern-
ance in cities like Athens, Marseille, Palermo, Barcelona, and Lisbon. As a
differential social, cultural and geopolitical territory, Southern Europe has its
own urban governance specificities that deserve attention. These specificities
rest on social and cultural pillars, often impacting several institutional and
governmental structures and all their normative and regulatory edifications
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(Seixas, 2008). As both a legal and non-legal product of the socio-cultural
stances existing in each urban society, urban governance (and its networks,
stakeholdings, projections, democratic and non-democratic expressions) is a
dimension that clearly reflects the existing specificities of every region. It
also convenes and expresses the heterogeneities and dilemmas projected
from every city into its own future.
Besides the role of the local scale, the Nation-State still preserves a major
role in defining each city’s positioning and corresponding urban governance
configurations and dynamics. This seems to be true even in such decentral-
ised states as Spain, or in cities with a powerful economy like Paris or Milan.
For many, “La République contre la ville” as expressed by François Ascher
(1998), showed and still shows to be the major framework where the
national, regional, and urban governance networks structure themselves.
This is also the case even when, as still occurs in vast urban Mediterranean
territories, the dominant role of the national governmental institutions proves
to be distant and even dismissive regarding attentive forms of strategic urban
planning and urban development policies, thereby arresting regulatory func-
tions at the local level (Chorianopoulos, 2002), and introducing distortions
and gaps in the confrontation between urban needs and each city’s govern-
ance capacities (Seixas, 2006).
This generalised disruptive panorama developed different urban govern-
ance dynamics and embeddedness capabilities in different urban socio-cul-
tural city configurations. Several cities have had difficulties in both their
socio-cultural affirmation and their political representation at more effective
influential scales. This has left fewer resources and capabilities for their local
governments and societies toward their own city development. This seems
to be the case for most of the Greek and Portuguese cities. Other cities, on
the contrary, have not only managed to have direct or semi-direct political
representation in important political arenas — such is the case of several
French cities whose maires have been influential deputies on the Assemblée
Nationale or even ministers in a long-established political tradition; or the
case of some Spanish regional capitals, whose main leaders have had occa-
sional political influence in Madrid. Some cities have also been able to de-
velop local and regional networks of urban and socio-cultural governance,
with corresponding results in their political and civic dynamics, and (obvi-
ously) with corresponding results in urban restructuring.
At the same time, due to their specific positioning in the local/regional to
national confrontations, the capital cities of these South European Nation-
States seem to reflect in a higher form these different mirrors and properties.
Their political capabilities range from the regional-configured considerable
autonomy of metropolitan Madrid (personifying in itself the double-face of
Spanish politics and its constant tug of war between national and regional
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levels) to the severe trapping paradoxes of Athens and Lisbon (these, on the
contrary, resulting with very little local and regional autonomy and highly
fragmented governance panoramas, facing strong and ever-present national
powers) and to the constant internal and politico-elitist struggles over Paris’
effective government, raising the governance stakeholdings in the city of
light (for ages, the main urban and cultural light for many Mediterraneans)
as probably the best demonstration of the political battles inherent to South-
ern European cities.
In order to best develop and deliver public policies, and to better obtain
the support of resources and stakeholders, several Southern Europe cities
have gone in search of new types of strategies, processes, structures, and
for more efficient solutions to manage and deliver public policies and to
channel the dizzying transformations experienced in the city and its citizenry.
Urban policies have been increasingly faced with the challenge of their own
redesign being conditioned by the introduction of inter-institutional needs for
cooperation between several governmental levels, and by parallel needs of
deeper coordination between multiple agents and interests. For at least the
last two decades, the options have often been to apply more liberal models
in the construction and management of urban policies and projects — even
when public coordinated, as would be expected for most of the South
European cities. On the other side, however, many other strategies and
policies maintained and even reinforced a considerable public and institutional
strategic control over urban projects, their developments, and results, even
when including new governance forms and designs. Nonetheless, the ten-
dency to follow one or the other political perspective seemed to depend more
on the conjugation of the ambitions of each city’s elites and main
stakeholders — and the corresponding strategies and urban projects — with
its own local and regional governance capacities and degrees of autonomy,
than on supposedly more concrete ideological or partisan choices.
Presently, almost none of the main Mediterranean urban regions has a
concrete metropolitan-scale government — with the relative exceptions of
the Madrid Autonomous Community, designed to avoid an effective “Federal
District” for the city; and the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, with a
certain degree of autonomy but constantly conflicting with central authori-
ties. Some metro-governments existed but were abolished (as in Barcelona),
while others may be considered as failed proposals (as the Italian cases).
These administrative scenarios lead to enormous political gaps and huge
practical problems, especially in crucial dimensions such as urban planning,
public and private transportation, energy, and environmental issues. There
are, however, public and functional-oriented metropolitan governance ar-
rangements, but all too often subject to considerable doses of political
communitarianism and lack of integrated coordination. These difficulties
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stem from all local levels and scales, resulting from inherited deficits or from
present day internal competitiveness between the different cities and towns
that configure each metropolitan region. And the case is that most of the
political and functional resources and processes on the public administration
apparels are driven to organically adapt to these intricate situations —
configuring highly complex governance structures in a panorama that most
of the time has no clear basis of collective strategy and public delivery
objectives.
That is why even in cities with a reasonable degree of autonomy and with
recognised urban thought and strategy (as has been the case of Barcelona)
the governance models followed, most visibly when materialised in large-
scale projects — like the 22@ economic district or the Sagrera high-speed
railway station in the Catalonian main city, the recent major investments in
Athens such as the Olympic infrastructures and the new airport, or the Expo
and Parque das Nações major investments in Lisbon — faced severe criti-
cism from many voices in their own urban societies (Albet, 2004).
Surely the perspective of the urban project has been proving to be a
relevant catalyser for urban governance dynamics, evolving economic and
social agents, framing clearer objectives both to collective action and to local
government administration (Pinson, 2009), and when effectively local, also
permitting some measure of civic participation and involvement. It has been
through these projections that developing coalitions, political communities,
and even pro-structural urban regimes of new types have been under rear-
rangement — their democratic culture and civic openness varying from quite
plural forms to very closed, stratified and non-democratic choices. Local
political agendas are, to a significant extent, today dominated by the logics
of these project-driven regimes, often overshadowing other scales for politi-
cal projection as well as local-type attentions, and leading the administrative
frameworks to clearly prefer new public management attitudes to the detri-
ment of new public administration actions (Mozzicafreddo, 2003), percep-
tively more complex to develop and surely much more delicate to negotiate
in the present institutional, party political, and labour union contexts. In
reference to one of the main questions proposed by the French literature on
these fields — Who Governs the City (Joana, 2000) — although we do not
consider that most of the urban regimes of major Southern European cities
have evolved toward structured glocalised competitive statist regimes (as
Brenner conceptualised for several urban regimes in the USA and Europe,
2004), we might consider that there is presently a considerable degree of
power hypertrophy sustained through semi-closed political communities.
The cultural and symbolic identities that Mediterranean cities and their
urban environments contain have become a crucial issue to attract new
investments (related to tourism, creativity, heritage, knowledge, ICT, etc.)
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in order to ensure a greater competitiveness. Urban marketing and branding
have been introduced as a regular promotional feature, although as a result,
rapid processes of standardisation of urban projects and products have
contributed to a relative banalisation of urban culture itself (Harvey and
Smith, 2005; Muñoz, 2008). These transformations brought by this new
cultural economy are also slowly reaching the huge peripheral territories of
the Mediterranean’s sprawling cities — vast territories urbanised throughout
the second half of the 20th century and that clearly changed the historical
geographical configuration of concentrated and dense cities, and where real
estate and retail/distribution — and big public investments themselves —
seem to continue to fragment social, economic, and environmental resources
in the name of enduring economic policies. And with the onset of the present
severe economic crisis, tendencies might be for these coalitions and urban
regimes to turn to more simplistic economic and symbolic competitiveness
objectives, becoming more oligarchic and less participative, and leaving less
space to the urban demands of large parts of the corresponding urban
societies.
However, differential political and civic pro-activity can also be noticed
in several directions. With the existence of a wide and otherwise consoli-
dated normative and political-institutional structure of government, there can
be seen several areas of policy and administrative innovation, strategic think-
ing, and even democratic improvement. These processes bring perspectives
for some change, together with other types of pressures and incentives
deriving from newer origins (from the demands of the city-system and the
urban society itself), but also pressures from other levels of government,
namely the European Union, through administrative decentralisation enforce-
ment, stronger local responsibilities, and new legal and fiscal frameworks.
Altogether, these imply new demands, new attitudes, and new positioning
for urban governments.
THE EU FACTOR
Regarding new kinds of governance, Southern European cities as a whole
have proceeded to adopt and adapt proposals from the North European
world which seemed likely to provide creative and innovative solutions. On
other occasions, “home-grown experiments” were carried out successfully
and retained for their original and beneficial solutions. Amongst the sugges-
tions hailing from “the other side of the Alps”, it is worth remarking upon
the policies drawn from the EU — such as the URBAN initiative — which
have managed to play a noteworthy role in the introduction of new concepts
and practices in urban areas of Southern Europe. However, the EU’s urban
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policies have often failed to adjust to the social, cultural and financial idi-
osyncrasies of Southern European cities. The reverse also shows to be true:
the singularities of Southern European urban policies have not always fit in
with Northern European spatial priorities or with their neo-corporate inter-
vention pattern, which is based on active policy integration of social and
financial agents on a local level.
Overall, the innovations introduced by Southern European urban policies
fall into two basic types. The first consists of new interactions between
public institutions and key agents of civil society in an attempt to boost
consensuses as well as social resources able to both formulate and imple-
ment urban policies: the key here must be found in the potential to produce
public goods through social practices. On the other hand, there are all sorts
of policies revolving around the interaction between public institutions and
private businesses, the essential characteristic of which is the forging of
partnerships between agents who share interests: novelty is rooted in the
regulatory and administrative contexts that encapsulate these partnerships,
therewith imposing both links and valuations.
One of the perhaps most direct consequences of the influence of the
urban policies of the EU on new ways of city governance in Southern
Europe is based on the spread of the competitiveness-cohesion dualism. This
is why cities are considered as the driving force of economic growth, hubs
for innovation, and key agents in the promotion and consolidation of inter-
national competition, as well as places in which various means of self-
organisation are created as civic mechanisms devised to compensate for the
deficiencies of markets and of the welfare state. This entails a sometimes
exasperating duality that sways between the city understood as a hub for
competitiveness (economic growth) and the city seen as a laboratory where
new kinds of social cohesion and citizen welfare are fostered.
Those two concepts are usually deemed to be either mutually exclusive
or symbiotic (cohesion in this case being a prerequisite to achieve compe-
tition). Many of the new types of governance thus speak of the need to
boost competitiveness, meant exclusively in terms of structural transforma-
tion and urban economic growth, where the city is considered a collective
agent who must capture resources that are scarce (such as economic invest-
ments, image, tourists, spectacular architecture) to secure an advantageous
spot in the urban market.
On the contrary, as regards cohesion, it has essentially been seen as a
formula intended to solve the many shortfalls and problems, legacy of the
failures and dismantling of the welfare state (the privatisation and externali-
sation of public services, increasing elderly population and growing foreign
immigration, the difficulty of securing housing, etc.) — and far from seeing
it as a social and solidary construction of inclusion and citizenship.
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One of the major consequences of the implementation of EU policies
might therefore reside in the strengthening of the belief that there is a close
and consequent correlation between cohesion and competitiveness. This has
led to the consolidation of a discourse according to which the success of
a competitive city almost necessarily entails the widespread prosperity of the
population. A major proportion of the investments accompanying these
European initiatives have often significantly altered some urban landscapes,
but not always taken into account the importance of cohesion as a social and
spatial justice factor.
From many of the new proposals on urban policy recently drawn up in
many Southern European cities, obvious changes have emerged in terms of
the objectives and structure of public activity regarding the governance of
the city and territory. Undoubtedly, much of this change has its origins in
EU policy enforcements. But a further and quite separate issue is whether
the new discourses on urban governance have meant effective changes in
urban governing practices and the ability of all these policies to effectively
address urban issues. Until now, in the Southern European urban world, it
seems that in these matters there are more intentions than successes: the
problems and difficulties that hinder changes and, above all, the power of
inertia and inefficiency (resisting innovation in all its shapes) are all factors
characterising the reduced level of application of new, genuinely transform-
ing means of governance.
The new governance has yet to move beyond the conjunction of exces-
sive rhetorical levels and good intentions, too often becoming embroiled in
simplistic, superficial, and manipulated debates regarding specific issues
(such as security, immigration, etc.) and also beyond relatively closed po-
litical and bureaucratic communities often seeking pseudo-social approval for
new policies and investments (such as airports, high-speed trains, major
media events, etc.). It would therefore seem that for now (with some
notable and praiseworthy exceptions), although new means of urban govern-
ance in Southern Europe show great potential in the realm of theory, these
continue to present serious difficulties in terms of their actual implementa-
tion. As a result, criticism is occasionally voiced regarding several EU ini-
tiatives and, as a whole, the implementation guidelines of new models of
governance which claim that these fail to reach beyond rhetorical attitudes,
whilst no genuine, deep changes to urban policy are perceived.
So rather than just assessing the true parameters required to analyse the
success and the effectiveness of the optimal urban governance, these ought
to be based on the evaluation of the levels of appropriation and dispossession
that the most different actors express. The reactions of citizens (which are
always legitimate, though sometimes slightly lacking in structure, apparently
incoherent, or even insolidary in kind), are a strong mirror of the intricate
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fit between the interests of the administration and the civic expectations.
Street demonstrations, associative life, and general civic mobilisation proc-
esses are keys in the process of shaping and consolidating the rights that
pave the way toward qualitative citizenship and “the right to the city” for all.
REFLECTIONS UPON SOUTHERN URBAN GOVERNANCE
New urban dynamics and scenarios demand new urban policies —
maybe even new urban politics. As stated at the beginning of this text, the
diffusion and hyper-positioning of urban geographies and human daily reali-
ties is bringing a complete set of dilemmas and challenges to Southern
European cities. Between socio-political reconfiguration tendencies and the
risks of fragmentation of urban politics itself, governance and its capabilities
of bringing together different and dispersed actors and aims surely opens
new possibilities, but also new uncertainties. Are meridional urban societies
quite aware of the pace of changes taking place, or do their cultural percep-
tions and socio-political structures remain at the side of contemporary risks
and challenges? And are their respective structures and cultures of govern-
ance efficiently and democratically adapting to new realities and challenges,
or do there exist significant imbalances causing limited and fragmented vi-
sions and political-administrative backwardness?
Surely, reinventing urban politics today means knowing how to better
understand and construct collective action instruments, commitments and
corresponding institutional management processes, able to better expand the
human, cultural, and relational wealth, thus improving social and civic capi-
tals and generating clearer responsibilities upon collective problems
(Subirats, 2001). The perspective of cities as local societies (Bagnasco and
Le Galès, 2000) mostly configured by informal and organic governance
networks turns out to be highly relevant to the cities of the Mediterranean,
springing from this perspective one of their most (if not the most) triggering
paradox: it is in the balancing between the strength of its socio-cultural
complexities, the deep fragmentalities inherent to its spatial and political
projections, and the (more recent) development of democratic principles and
civic demands, that is posed the potential to break with inertias and
particularisms and to create interesting, innovative, and socially responsible
proposals. As some researchers argue, the fractalities of contemporary ur-
banity might ultimately well prove to be one of the most interesting meta-
bolical bases for new sorts of urban socio-political challenges and opportu-
nities (Rhodes, 1997; Kooiman, 2003).
Vis-à-vis this complex background, still considerably opaque in the
conceptualisation of its dynamics, it seems important to develop new types
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of questionings and to open new conceptual and analytical perspectives —
both in the interpretation of the new political attitudes in the cities, and on
their own capabilities to conveniently shape and project them — questionings
that (in the domains of the academic research) have been raised in recent
years through several fields of analysis, namely: the place and scope of city
politics; the political economy and its urban projections; the urban govern-
ance debates; the urban regime approaches; the social capital and the cultural
capital in the cities; the actor’s strategies and the socio-political systems.
Recognisably, the governance focusing in the urban politics realms has
been establishing new mechanisms and institutional procedures that can be
driven both top-down and bottom-up. More autonomous and empowering
agents appear in face of the traditional political parties and political institu-
tions, as do policies needing to be developed through constant negotiation
between the diverse agents and through consensuses built by a State that,
in itself, also becomes more polycentric. In many South European societies,
where the power and the role of the State has been traditionally strong but
not so democratic and even less participative-driven, governance becomes
an undoubted opportunity for different forms of inclusion and for diverse
ways of political and public management. State, leaving the hierarchical,
unidirectional, and monopolistic structure of government, has a tendency to
rethink “down” its capabilities of government, and becomes just one more
agent in a system of government more and more based on plural networks.
The somewhat different paces addressed in cities like Barcelona and some
French cities (notwithstanding some criticism of the relative variation of its
outcomes) show nonetheless that urban governance networks can evolve
through plural and democratic empowering manners, following effective pro-
collective processes, objectives and public deliveries. Surely in these cities
there exist specific characteristics that owe a great deal to considerable social
capital directed toward urban and territorial self-development and autonomy
(like the Catalonian case), or to strong political enforcements and complex
stakeholding governance networks (mostly the case of France). But these are
precisely cases whose frameworks and dynamics should be better analysed
and interpreted in the light of urban governance’s possible developments.
It would be obviously too naïve to draw strict and overall generalisations
when it comes to a territory as large and diverse as is the one that spans
from Lisbon to Istanbul, crossing varied political realities from local to
national and inclusively European scales. Some major frameworks on a
specific Southern city region — like, say, Rome, from its central State path-
dependencies to specific configurations of its society’s social and cultural
capital — surely differ substantially from parallel frameworks for other
meridional city regions like Barcelona, Marseille, and Thessaloniki. The con-
sequences on each city of the tendencies above expressed depend consid-
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erably on the potentialities, limitations, inner forces, and dilemmas underlying
the socio-cultural, political, and administrative structures that exist in each
city. This growing importance of the local and cultural spheres shows that
it will very much depend on the urban socio-cultural capitals and
stakeholding networks of each city and urban society, the resources of
responsibility, and capability for the security and qualification of its own
future. But following precisely this reasoning that puts culture as the most
structural influential element for urban governance, one must at the same
time give careful attention to the widest and most common cultural legacies
affecting all these urban societies and territories — the Mediterranean culture.
Whatever the case may be, within the Southern European urban contexts
here analysed several common features and respective interpretations and
reflections stand out:
a) In most of the Southern European cities, the secular limitation of local
powers when working toward decisive negotiative and resourceful
capacities is remarkable. In many Mediterranean countries the weak-
nesses of local administrations, coupled with chronic issues regarding
fiscal and financial support of its existence, have by and large con-
ditioned their autonomy and political competences in terms of drawing
up their own policies and thus local empowerment. On a number of
occasions, the considerable weight of the central administration has
failed to show an increase of infrastructures, equipment, or services
in the local scale, so that the Welfare State has often been poorly (or
belatedly) expressed on the urban Mediterranean scales. This lesser
importance given to Mediterranean cities compared with the higher
local dynamism of Central and Northern Europe cities does not simply
refer to the legacy of the industrial era (and consequently to the
weaker economic and industrial growth displayed by many Southern
cities), but has also been due to the spread of more organised and
successful democratic processes and actors (including most influen-
tial forms of participation, cooperative activity, non-governmental
activity) historically more inherent to the latter.
b) Over the last 30 years, some of these meridional countries have
initiated regional decentralisation processes of varying scopes, which
have brought about — with debatable success — a greater focus on
intermediate and local territorial scales. These decentralisation proc-
esses still have not quite hit the right expression on the local level and
have sometimes even proven detrimental. For one thing, it remains
extremely improbable to develop political structures with effective
power and that might better approach present main challenges
(namely in the metropolitan and the micro-local or even citizenry
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scales). For another thing, cities still remain on the edges of the main
developmental and political economy policies, despite their recognition
as important developmental actors and the continuous rise of dis-
courses considering the importance of higher local embeddedness.
Nevertheless, on a few occasions some Southern European cities
have stood out as references in urban socioeconomic and political
development in order to become something of a “model” for other
cities (like Barcelona, Bologna, or Toulouse).
c) The considerable sprawl and socio-spatial fragmentation of the Medi-
terranean city — largely caused by meridional socio-political
stakeholding structures and by the corresponding effects on the urban
production models — seems to be, in the absence of effective met-
ropolitan identity patterns, paradoxically fragmenting the traditional
modes of urban governance and fomenting the loss of historical or-
ganic processes of local political stakeholding. This is an hypothesis
not completely confirmed, though it is mostly based on the impor-
tance of the spatial and cultural bases for the configurations of me-
ridional urban governance networks, from partisan to social and eco-
nomic. But if confirmed, is this a tendency that might be exacerbating
the political lags on administration, strategy, and policy formation or,
on the contrary, might it be contributing to configure new governance
structures based more on territorial perspectives, and more directed
to effective urban delivery issues? It seems that (also) one very im-
portant political direction to follow in the face of these disruptive
tendencies should be to create regional-metropolitan institutions and
governments — for these meta-governance formations and its socio-
political resources to better objectify a large-scale political space to
effectively influence the evolution of the entire urban region — thus
being the basis for new forms of metropolitan governance networks.
d) As stated before, crucial doubts and uncertainties remain regarding
local governance configurations and strategies — the idea and expres-
sion of governance not being by definition a guaranteed qualitative
element in itself. This is strikingly true in urban societies like the
Mediterranean ones, where social capital has always been complex
and varied, but considerably fractal, highly personalised, or even
populist, and not so much absolutely oriented to objective collective
strategies or to effectively accountable democratic scenarios. Follow-
ing discourses of strong catalysing projects, of cooperation and par-
ticipation, and of flexibility and optimisation of urban policies, urban
governance has often been understood in Meridional Europe as a way
for urban governments to stimulate populist or oligarchic regimes, or
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to discharge several of their responsibilities, often resulting in the
disempowerment of strategic scales of action, in lower transparency,
and weaker public control, in the avoidance of social objectives.
e) Surely influenced by European directives, for the first time national
strategies of countries like Greece and Portugal have objectively rec-
ognised cities as a main asset for development and sustainability, thus
raising the political and symbolic importance of their own urban ter-
ritories. This is a tendency already consolidating for some time in
regionalised Spain and in the quite territorially politicised France —
precisely the two countries where the differential paces are particu-
larly noticeable in urban policy and governance realms. This point —
as the previous ones, actually — highlights the relevance of the State
and its perspectives of political and administrative reorientation and
restructuring, as a main actor precisely to permit (or cut back) the
reinforcement of democratic metropolitan and local governance.
f) Finally, we should recognise the most important novelties occurring
in other socio-cultural and civic dimensions in the Southern European
urban territories. As Leontidou recently expressed (2010), there has
been a notable cultural tendency in the Southern European civil soci-
eties, steadily observing the maturation of the cosmopolitanism of its
inhabitants. These are transformations that can be understood through
the widest social landscapes, from quite different life-styles to the
most varied urban social movements and civic demands. For
Leontidou, this is an evolution that deconstructs the traditional North-
South divide (and several other dualisms), but that at the same time
“broadens geographical imaginations in Europe” (Leontidou, 2010, p.
1197). These urban civic expressions are rapidly moving toward much
more sophisticated forms and contents, their development being itself
made through more organic-driven processes. Overall, it is a dynamic
civic and cultural panorama that is certainly framing a new political
culture and that will certainly have profound and long-term influences
on the governance and political spheres of the Mediterranean cities.
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